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THE GOVERNMENT SECURITIES MARKET: IN THE
WAKE OF ESM*
The government [securities] market, which used to be stuffy and
humdrum, has evolved over the last decade and a half into the
most active, exciting, and innovative sector of the money
market.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Numerous recent bankruptcies of government securities dealers
have stimulated a new awareness of the world's largest securities
market-the government securities market-and its lack of regula-
tion. Recent failures of two relatively small dealers have resulted in
losses of over $500 million to their respective customers.' One of
these failures nearly precipitated the collapse of the Ohio savings and
loan industry.'
A continuation of dealer bankruptcies may frighten investors
away from the government securities market, thus reducing the mar-
ket's liquidity and undermining the government's monetary policy.
This is particularly important because the government securities
market is the primary tool used by the Federal Reserve Board
(FRB) to control the nation's economy." The FRB exercises its mon-
etary policy by purchasing and selling Treasury securities through
the government securities market.'
This comment examines the structure of the government securi-
ties market, the unscrupulous practices of some of its dealers, and the
need for statutory reform. The following section describes the eco-
© 1987 by Terry F. Rogers
* The author would like to express his appreciation to Beth A. Finley, M.B.A., for her
contribution in the preparation of this comment.
1. M. STIGUM, THE MONEY MARKET 425 (rev. ed. 1983).
2. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, REQUEST FOR COMMENTS ON THE
OVERSIGHT OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT AND AGENCY SECURITY MARKET, EXCHANGE ACT
Rel. No. 34-21959, 50 Fed. Reg. 15,904, 15,908 (Apr. 1985) [hereinafter SEC COMMENTS
REQUEST].
3. Id.
4. See infra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
5. These are the so-called "open market operations." See W. HOSEK & F. ZANN, MON-
ETARY THEORY POLICY AND FINANCIAL MARKETS 44 (1977).
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nomic conditions which led to the 1986 adoption of legislation to
regulate the market. Section III examines the problems in the gov-
ernment securities market and distinguishes them from past
problems in other securities markets. Section IV proposes alternative
regulatory measures. Finally, Section V concludes that overregula-
tion of the government securities market will emasculate the most
important securities market in the world.
II. BACKGROUND
The government securities market is by far the largest securities
exchange in the world." With daily trading volume exceeding $40
billion,' the government securities market dwarfs its more well-
known counterparts; for example, daily trading volume is nearly
seventy times the value of all corporate securities traded on all U. S.
stock exchanges." Furthermore, because the government securities
market is the primary tool used by the United States government to
finance public debt and to implement monetary policy, it is perhaps
the most important securities market in the world.'
A. What is a Government Security?
An understanding of the government securities market is
necessary both to appreciate the problems which have arisen and
consequently to prevent them in the future. To begin an examination
of the market, the term "government security" must be defined. In
its most straightforward form, a government security is a United
States government bond used to finance public debt.' ° Like corporate
bonds, government securities are traded by individuals and
institutions who hope to make a profit. However, the buyer of a
government security is virtually assured of safety from default be-
cause government securities are secured by the United States
6. OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, TREASURY BULLETIN,
1985-1 C.B. 15 Table F.D.-2. [hereinafter TREASURY BULLETIN].
7. Estimates of trading volume vary widely. One report conservatively estimates that
volume may exceed $40 billion per day. See NEW YORK STATE ASSEMBLY COMM. ON WAYS
AND MEANS, GAMBLING WITH PUBLIC FUNDS: THE LION CAPITAL BANKRUPTCY AND ITS
IMPIICATIONS FOR GOVERNMENT INVESTMENT PRACTICES 41 (1985) [hereinafter NEW
YORK WAYS AND MEANS REPORT]. Another observer has estimated that volume may exceed
$200 billion a day. See Breaking the Freewheelers, TIME, Apr. 22, 1985 at 47.
8. TREASURY BULLETIN, supra note 6, at 15. By comparison, average daily trading
volume on the New York Stock Exchange in 1984 was $773,426,000. See NEW YORK STOCK
EXCHANGE FA: BOOK 71 (1985).
9. M. STIGUM, supra note 1, at 425.
10. See F. FABOZZI, THE HANDBOOK OF MORTGAGE BACKED SECURITIES 16 (1985).
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1. Treasury Securities
Perhaps the most well-known type of government securities are
Treasury securities, which are direct obligations of the federal gov-
ernment. They are issued in several forms, varying in denomination,
maturity, and interest paid.' 2
The simplest of the Treasury securities is the Series EE and
HH bonds, commonly known as savings bonds. Issued by the United
States Treasury, these securities are usually purchased by small
investors.1 Another familiar Treasury security is the "Treasury
Bill." "T-Bills," as they are called, have a maximum maturity of
one year and are sold at a discount from their face value.' The
difference between the discount price and the maturity value is con-
sidered to be the interest income.
Similar to T-Bills are "Treasury Notes" which are Treasury
obligations that pay interest semi-annually and usually have maturi-
ties of between one and ten years. 5 The final type of Treasury
securities are "Treasury Bonds" which are essentially Treasury
Notes with longer maturities, usually between ten and thirty-five
years.' 6
2. Government Guaranteed Securities
The more esoteric government securities are the obligations
issued by federally-owned agencies which are, therefore, direct obli-
gations of the United States government. The most well-known of
these are the Government National Mortgage Association obliga-
tions, or "Ginnie Maes."' 7
Securities issued by United States government sponsored agen-
11. M. STGuM, supra note 1, at 430.
12. All Treasury securities are issued pursuant to the Securities and Exchange Act of
1934, section 3(a)(12), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(12) (1982) [hereinafter Exchange Act].
13. These savings bonds play virtually no role in the government securities market be-
cause they are non-negotiable and are issued in small denominations.
14. T-Bills are available in three, six, and twelve month maturities. The minimum, and
most common denomination, is $10,000, but T-bills can be purchased in multiples of $5,000
above the minimum, up to a maximum of $1,000,000. FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS
CITY, BUYING TREASURY SECURITIES AT THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANKS 3 (1984) [hereinaf-
ter FRBKC REPORT].
15. Id. at 9.
16. Id.
17. See U.S. Government Mortgage Bonds, SEC No-Action Letter, [1976-77 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 14 80,819 at 87,159 (Oct. 1, 1976).
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cies are similar to Ginnie Maes, but differ in that they are not direct
obligations of the United States government, and thus, in theory, are
not as safe an investment. An example of these agency securities is
the so-called "Fannie Maes," which are obligations of the Federal
National Mortgage Association used to fund home loans."8
3. Money Market Instruments
The most arcane government securities are the money market
instruments such as "federal funds" and "repurchase agreements."' 9
Federal funds are pools of cash which the FRB requires commercial
banks to have on hand for liquidity purposes.2" Banks holding inade-
quate cash reserves may borrow from those banks which have excess
reserves. These funds are usually loaned overnight with interest paid
for one day.2' The interest is paid at the federal funds rate, which
fluctuates a great deal from day to day, and is the base upon which
all other interest rates are established.22
Most of the problems in the government securities market have,
however, originated in what one observer calls the "darkest, most
mysterious corner: the netherworld of repurchase agreements." 2
"Repos," as these agreements are called, are investment devices
which have become an integral part of the world economy,2 4 ena-
bling institutional investors and government securities dealers to
exchange cash for government securities. Many cities, pension funds
and universities (hereinafter referred to as "lending institutions") use
repurchase agreements to lend idle cash for short periods of time,
often just overnight." The rate of return on repurchase agreements
18. Fannie Maes are authorized and issued pursuant to the Federal National Mortgage
Association Charter Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1717c. (1982).
19. There are many forms of government securities, but the most important credit
instruments in the money market include Treasury Bills, commercial paper, banker accept-
ances, certificates of deposit, repurchase agreements and federal funds. See NEW YORK WAYS
AND MEANS REPORT, supra note 7, at 36, 37.
20. See Reserve Requirements of Depository Institutions, 12 C.F.R. 204 (1985) [herein-
after Reserve Requirements].
21. The interest paid is computed on a 360-day.year. FRBKC REPORI, supra note 14,
at 7.
22. NEW YORK WAYS AND MEANS REPORT, supra note 7, at 36.
23. Worthy, The Troubled Market in Federal Securities, FORTUNE, May 13, 1985, at
84.
24. 129 CONG. REC. E3184 (daily ed. June 27, 1983) (Statement by Rep. Fauntroy).
"The repo market is as complex as it is crucial. It is built upon transactions that are highly
interrelated. A collapse of one institution involved in repo transactions could start a chain
reaction, putting at risk hundreds of billions of dollars and threatening the solvency of many
additional institutions." Id.
25. There are three types of repurchase agreements: overnight repos, open repos,
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is higher than the prevailing rate on Treasury Bills26 and can be
easily structured to meet the needs of the parties.2 7
B. Market Operation
In a typical repurchase agreement, a government securities
dealer trades government securities for a lending institution's cash.
The dealer agrees to repurchase securities from the lending institu-
tion the following morning at a price slightly higher than the
amount of cash received, hence the name "repurchase agreement. '"28
The increase in price the dealer pays for the repurchase of securities
is essentially the interest charged for the overnight use of the cash.29
Upon entering into the repo, the dealer is supposed to wire the gov-
ernment securities into the lending institution's account30 and in
return, receive the lending institution's cash.
The dealer then sells the cash to a savings and loan (S & L) or
other financial institution (hereinafter referred to as the "borrowing
institution") in need of funds for liquidity purposes. 1 In return, the
borrowing institution wires government securities into the dealer's
account and agrees to repurchase them the following morning at a
and term repos. Any of these can be set up as a reverse repo by a dealer using
securities to obtain funds rather than investing money. With an 'overnight' repo,
the investor gets a one day rate from the dealer. Typically, the money is wired
through the Federal Reserve System and the securities are placed in a segre-
gated account. The next day, the dealer wires the funds plus interest to the
investor and the securities are released by the investor to the dealer.
An 'open' or 'continuing contract' repo is initiated with agreement by both
the investor and dealer that an overnight contract will continually renew unless
terminated by either party to the contract. The rate of interest will fluctuate
with market rates, and the original contract rate may be lower as a result of the
high liquidity provided to the investor.
'Term' or 'lock up' repos are set up for periods longer than overnight. The
term repo rate is usually higher for longer contract periods to compensate for
the decreased liquidity. Term repos are used by dealers in 'matched book trans-
actions' to attempt to match the maturities of their assets and liabilities, or to
tailor investments for a specified time period. 'Flex' repos are a specific type of
term repo that encompasses variable (usually declining) sums over time.
NEW YORK WAYS AND MEANS REPORT, supra note 7, at 51.
26. FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK, CAPITAL ADEQUACY GUIDELINES FOR
U.S. GOVERNMENT SECURITIES DEALERS 17 n.2 (1985) [hereinafter FRBNY GUIDELINES].
27. However, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) has suggested a
ninety-day limit on repurchase agreements. 47 Fed. Reg. 37,248 (1982) (Proposed Amendment
Relating to Restrictions on Non-deposit Obligations).
28. M. STIGUM, supra note 1, at 415.
29. Id.
30. Individual banks' computers are linked by wire to FRB district banks which in turn
are linked to the FRB central computer. Id. at 363-64.
31. Reserve Requirements, supra note 20.
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higher price. This exchange between a dealer and a borrowing insti-
tution is known as a "reverse repurchase agreement."32
The next morning, the dealer sells the securities back to the
borrowing institution."3 The dealer then repurchases securities from
the lending institution at a slightly lower price than the borrowing
institution paid the dealer. The dealer's profit is the difference
between these two amounts. Figure 1 graphically illustrates these
transactions.
Repo Reverse
Repo
Afternoon:
INSTIUTIO P 10.2 Million in , E LE 10.2 Million in INT U IO J
Government Securities Government Secrities
Next Morning:
$10 Million in CasMt
Govenment Smriies Government Securities
Figure 1
Assume a transaction involves $10 million in cash and $10.2
million in government securities, and the prevailing interest rate is
10%. The borrowing institution gains overnight use of the $10 mil-
lion for liquidity purposes, and the lending institution earns interest
on its idle funds. The government securities dealer earns an eighth of
a percentage point interest on $10 million for acting as a middleman
in the transaction. On an overnight transaction such as this, the
dealer nets only $34.72, and the lending institution earns 10% inter-
est for the overnight use of its funds, or $2,777.78. Because of this
small gain on each transaction, dealers must enter into numerous
repurchase agreements in order to be profitable.
32. NOVIKOFF & LEVIN, REPURCHASE AND REVERSE REPURCHASE AGREEMENTS 23
(1984).
33. The overnight repo is simply the most common. However, repos may be structured
in several different ways. See NEW YORK WAYS AND MEANS REPORT, supra note 7.
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This need for high volume sets the stage for dealers and lending
institutions to take advantage of the market's lack of regulation. Cur-
rently, there are no requirements for securing collateral. A wire costs
a lending institution approximately forty dollars per transaction, 4
and because lending institutions are hesitant to incur any additional
costs, they sometimes fail to demand that the securities be wired into
their account."a This enables dealers, driven by their need for high
volume, to use the same securities as collateral in more than one
transaction."6 The inherent problem in this practice is that any one
of several factors, such as market fluctuations, may force these deal-
ers into insolvency, 7 and ultimately harm those lending institutions
who failed to require collateralization.
C. Market Participants
1. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York
The major participant in the government securities market is
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY), 8 the branch of
the FRB responsible for selling all United States Treasury securi-
ties.3 9 The FRBNY acts like an investment banker4 for the United
34. SEC COMMENTS REQUEST, supra note 2, at 15,908.
35. At times, dealers will offer a slightly higher interest rate if they are allowed to
maintain possession of the collateral. This was apparently the case in some of the most flagrant
abuses in the past few years. See, e.g., In re Lombard-Wall, Inc., 23 Bankr. 165 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1982).
36. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) has issued a pamphlet for repo
market participants, entitled "It's 8 a.m.-Do You Know Where Your Collateral Is?", which
encourages lending institutions involved with repos to take custody of the securities involved
and to monitor their market value daily. The pamphlet also urges investors to know the firm
with whom they are dealing, including the background of the firm and the capabilities of its
management. (On file at the Santa Clara University Law Review).
37. For examples of cases in which repurchase agreements were involved, see First Nat'l
Bank v. Estate of Russell, 657 F.2d 668, 669 (5th Cir. 1981); In re Legel, Braswell Gov't Sec.
Corp., 648 F.2d 321, 324 n.5 (5th Cir. 1981); Cosmopolitan Credit & Inv. Corp. v. Blyth
Eastman Dillon & Co., 507 F. Supp. 954, 956 (S.D. Fla. 1981).
38. The FRBNY is one of twelve regional Federal Reserve banks which provide whole-
sale banking services to financial institutions. All twelve district banks are responsible for dis-
tributing money, processing checks, and transferring money by wire to banks, savings and
loans, and credit unions.
39. REPORT OF THE JOINT TREASURY-SEC-FEDERAL RESERVE STUDY OF THE GOV-
ERNMENT RELATED SECURITIES MARKETS 37 (1980) [hereinafter TREASURY-SEC-FRB
STUDY].
40. Investment banks are capital-raising institutions as opposed to commercial banks
which are primarily lending institutions. Investment banks are in the business of bringing
securities to market. This is normally done through public offerings, in which the investment
bank, which is the primary underwriter of the security, will form a "syndicate" of other
investment banks and brokerage firms to distribute the new security. See T.L. HAZEN, THE
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27
States government by bringing the Treasury securities to market.
The FRBNY auctions all new Treasury securities, and also buys
and sells government securities in the open market to carry out the
FRB's monetary policy; this activity is a cornerstone of the modern
American economy." Also, like an investment banker, the FRBNY
has formed its own "syndicate,"' 2 the so-called "primary dealers."
2. The Primary Dealers
The primary dealers are the firms given the privilege of
purchasing a large volume of securities directly from the federal gov-
ernment.' 8 They are comprised of large commercial and investment
banks, including such firms as Salomon Brothers, Morgan Stanley,
and Bank of America, but also include smaller specialized opera-
tions."" Primary dealers must meet minimum capital requirements
and file daily, monthly, and yearly reports regarding their trading
activity with the FRBNY.' 5
The primary dealers receive numerous benefits from their privi-
leged status. They are in a position to gather and interpret the latest
information on monetary policy, because the FRBNY purchases
securities from primary dealers when it is increasing the money sup-
LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 654-61 (1985). See also SEC Reg. 70(c)(4), 17 C.F.R. §
250.70(c)(4) (1985).
41. Note, Repurchase Agreements and the Bankruptcy Code: The Need for Legislative
Action, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 828, 843 (1984).
42. See T.L. HAZEN, supra note 40, at 654-61.
43. TREASUR-SEC-FRB STUDY, supra note 39, at 37.
44. The complete list of primary dealers as of 1985 included: Bank of America N.T. &
S.A.; Bankers Trust Company; Bear, Stearns & Co.; A.G. Becker Paribas Incorporated;
Briggs, Schaedle & Co., Inc.; Carroll McEntee & McGinley Incorporated; Chase Manhattan
Government Securities, Inc.; Chemical Bank; Citibank, N.A.; Crocker National Bank; Dis-
count Corporation of New York; Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Securities Corporation;
Drexel Burnham Lambert Government Securities, Inc.; The First Boston Corporation; First
Interstate Bank of California; First National Bank of Chicago; Goldman, Sachs & Co.;
Greenwich Capital Markets, Inc.; Harris Trust and Savings Bank; E.F. Hutton & Company,
Inc.; Kidder, Peabody & Co., Inc.; Kleinwort Benson Government Securities, Inc.; Aubrey G.
Lanston & Co., Inc.; Lehman Government Securities, Inc.; Manufacturers Hanover Trust
Company; Merrill Lynch Government Securities, Inc.; Morgan Guaranty Trust Company of
New York; Morgan Stanley & Co. Inc.; The Northern Trust Company; Paine Weber, Inc.;
Win. E. Pollack Government Securities, Inc.; Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc.; Refco Part-
ners; Salomon Brothers, Inc.; Smith Barney Government Securities, Inc.; Dean Witter Reyn-
olds Inc. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 99TH CONG., 1ST SESS., SURVEY OF THE FEDERAL
RESERVE SYSTEM'S SUPERVISION OF THE TREASURY SECURITIES MARKET: (A DISCUSSION
PAPER PREPARED FOR THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON DOMESTIC MONETARY POLICY OF THE
COMMITTEE ON BANKING, FINANCE AND URBAN AFFAIRS, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-
TIVES) (1985) [hereinafter GAO REPORT].
45. H.R. REP. No. 258, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1985) [hereinafter House Report].
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ply, and sells to them when it is tightening the money supply." An-
other advantage enjoyed by the primary dealers is the opportunity to
sell the securities which they have purchased from the FRBNY to
other "secondary" dealers who do not have the same access to the
Treasury auction.4"
3. The Secondary Dealers
Since government securities have been exempt from regulation
by the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934,48 the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC)49 does not know who these "secondary
dealers" are, or even how many exist.5" Thus, there may be hun-
dreds of secondary dealers operating without any. regulatory
oversight. Although many are either banks which must satisfy capi-
tal requirements and the rules of the banking regulators, 1 or broker-
age firms which must follow SEC capital requirements,"2 there re-
46. Id. at 13 n.6.
47. NEw YORK WAYS AND MEANS REPORT, supra note 7, at 42.
48. When used in this title, unless the context otherwise requires, the term 'ex-
empted security' or 'exempted securities' includes securities which are direct ob-
ligations of, or obligations guaranteed as to principal or interest by, the United
States; such securities issued or guaranteed by corporations in which the United
States has a direct or indirect interest as shall be designated for exemption by
the Secretary of the Treasury as necessary or appropriate in the public interest
or for the protection of investors; municipal securities, as defined in section
3(a)(29) of this title.
Securities & Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a)(12), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(12) (1982).
49. The SEC is the federal agency with which registration statements must be filed on
new issues of securities and which supervises the operation of securities exchanges and related
aspects of the securities business. See J. WESTON & E. BRIGHAM, MANAGERIAL FINANCE
1076-77 (7th ed. 1981).
50. Estimates range from 200 to 300 dealers in this unregulated category. However, the
number could be even larger. See GAO REPORT, supra note 44, at 12-13. See also SEC
COMMENTS REQUEST, supra note 2, at 15,905.
51. In addition to the informal oversight activities of the FRBNY for primary
dealers in the government securities area, all activities of banks, including their
government securities activities and investment practices, are subject to the direct
regulatory oversight of the appropriate regulatory authority for the bank (the
FRB, the Comptroller of the Currency, or the Federal Deposit Insurance Cor-
poration). Moreover, the investment activities of many institutional entities in
the government securities market are subject to review by regulatory bodies that
supervise them. For instance, the FHLBB [Federal Home Loan Bank Board)
provides regulatory oversight over savings and loan. associations and other thrift
institutions, the National Credit Union Association (NCUA) over credit unions,
the Department of Labor over pension funds, and state insurance commissions
over insurance companies.
SEC COMMENTS REQU'ST, supra note 2, at 15,906.
52. This is the so-called "uniform net capital rule." SEC Reg. 15c3-1, 17 C.F.R. §
240.15c3-1 (1985).
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
mains a large group of secondary dealers operating in a regulatory
void. 8
This lack of regulation has enabled these secondary dealers to
take risks that dealers in regulated securities markets are not
permitted to assume. This is not the case on the organized exchanges
where all traders are required to register. However, government se-
curities are not traded on an organized exchange like the New York
Stock Exchange. Rather, they are traded much like securities on the
over-the-counter market 4 in that the dealers are linked by telephone
and computer, instead of standing together on a trading floor."
Trading activity on the floors or in the pits of the major stock, op-
tion, and commodity exchanges is relatively easy to monitor due to
the physical proximity of the traders. However, when traders are
physically separated, as in the government securities market, the task
of monitoring them becomes more difficult. This difficulty is com-
pounded even further because registration of government securities
dealers is not required.' 6 The lack of a registration requirement has
enabled individuals who possess very little knowledge 57 about the
market to operate as dealers without supervision of their business
practices or financial stability.'"
D. Recent Failures of Government Securities Dealers
The SEC estimates that losses to investors due to the 1985 col-
lapse of two secondary dealers alone surpassed $500 million. 9
Unfortunately, these failures do not represent a new problem. The
last several years have seen the failure, or near failure, of numerous
government securities firms: Winters Government Securities and
Hibbard and O'Connor Government Securities60 in 1977, Lombard-
Wall Government Securities" and Drysdale Government
53. However, a small number of secondary dealers report voluntarily. SEC COMMENTS
REQUEST, supra note 2, at 15,905.
54. The over-the-counter market is regulated by the National Association of Securities
Dealers (NASD), a self-regulatory organization which has rulemaking inspection and enforce-
ment authority subject to SEC oversight. T.L. HAZEN, supra note 40, at 258.
55. Id.
56. See supra note 48.
57. See infra note 58.
58. See, e.g., SEC v. Miller, 495 F. Supp. 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), as an example of how
easily one can enter into the government securities market. (The defendant in this action con-
verted his Iowa trucking company into a government securities dealership with less than 52
million in assets. Within a few years he had $18 million in liabilities.).
59. SEC COMMENTS REQUEST, supra note 2, at 15,904.
60. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 45, at 18.
61. In re Lombard-Wall Inc., 23 Bankr. 165 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982).
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Securities"' in 1982, and Lion Capital63 and RTD Securities Inc."
in 1984. All of these failures and near failures involved the repo
market."
1. The Ohio Savings Loan Crisis
In early 1985, ESM Government Securities (ESM), a Florida-
based dealer, was forced into insolvency with over $300 million in
losses.66 The panic set off by this failure eventually forced Ohio
Governor Richard Celeste to declare the first banking holiday since
the Great Depression.6 7
ESM had extensive dealings in repurchase agreements with
Home State Savings and Loan, a Cincinnati S & L controlled by
Marvin L. Warner, former United States Ambassador to Switzer-
land.66  In essence, the ESM-Home State transactions were
repurchase agreements entered into without adequate collateral; 9
ESM had been using the same securities as collateral in numerous
transactions for many years and had also issued inaccurate financial
statements. o
The magnitude of the panic in Ohio created by ESM's failure
was so great because Home State was backed only by state, not fed-
eral, deposit insurance. When it became clear that Home State
would suffer enormous losses from its dealings with ESM, Home
State closed its doors.7 1 This was a potential threat to all state-in-
sured Ohio S & L's because the losses incurred by Home State could
have exhausted, Ohio's deposit insurance fund. Thus, a run on the S
62. The Drysdale bankruptcy left Chase Manhattan Bank with over $100 million in
losses. Wells, Drysdale: What Really Happened, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Sept. 1982, at
74.
63. NF:w YORK WAYS AND MEANS REPORT, supra note 7, at 1.
64. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 45, at 18.
65. For an examination of the bankruptcy implications, see Note, Lifting the Cloud of
Uncertainty Over the Repo Market: Characterization of Repos as Separate Purchases and
Sales of Securities, 37 VAND. L. REV. 401, 419 (1984).
66. Worthy, supra note 23, at 80.
67. See Maggin, The Repo Men: Scandals in the Bond Market, MGMT. REV., Jan.
1986, at 34.
68. Id.
69. Kerwin, Gauging the Fallout from E.S.M., BARRON'S, Mar. 25, 1985, at 64.
70. The SEC had in fact charged ESM with fraud eight years earlier. Under the guise
of learning more about the government securities market, an SEC investigator was sent to
ESM to observe ESM's operation. The SEC thereafter charged ESM with fraud. The suit
was, however, dismissed because the SEC must first have evidence of fraud in order to investi-
gate an unregulated dealer such as ESM. Wallace, Home State and ESM: The Regulators
Knew Plenty, BusINEsS WEEK, Apr. 8, 1985, at 34.
71. Id.
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& L's began, and Governor Celeste was forced to close seventy-one
state-insured lenders in order to halt the panic.
2. BBS Failure
Later in 1985, another government securities dealer was forced
into receivership. Bevill, Bresler & Schulman Asset Management
(BBS), a small New Jersey dealer, 2 experienced difficulties similar
to those of ESM; BBS had also been using its securities as collateral
in more than one transaction. 3 These practices eventually led to
losses of $140 million.74
E. Legislation to Regulate the Market
The fraudulent nature of these recent losses has resulted in a
call for closer scrutiny of the government securities market. Those in
favor of regulation have argued that the ESM and BBS bankruptcies
could have been prevented had there been a reporting structure in
place.7" They point to the fact that the SEC had suspected irregular-
ities at ESM as much as eight years prior to ESM's failure but was
prevented from pursuing an investigation because it was unable to
prove fraud. 6 In any other securities market, the SEC could have
stepped in immediately by virtue of its regulatory powers.
The proponents of regulation also have argued that unless the
government securities market is strictly regulated, it may not survive
because the market's participants will seek out only the largest and
safest firms with which to do business. 7 Competition would thus be
substantially reduced, augmenting the influence of the already pow-
erful primary dealers.7 '
Opponents of regulation have asserted that solving the problems
facing the market through government regulation would disrupt the
market to such an extent that its viability might be jeopardized.
72. Another Bankruptcy, L.A. Daily J., Apr. 12, 1985, at 4, col. I.
73. Id.
74. Breaking the Freewheelers, TIME, Apr. 22, 1985, at 47. Some estimates have ranged
even higher. SEC COMMENTS REQuESr, supra note 2, at 15,907 (estimates that losses were
$223 million).
75. See Fauntroy, Fed Should Keep Watchful Eye Over Treasury Dealers, L.A. Daily
J., Apr. 16, 1985, at 4, col. 3.
76. See Wallace, supra note 70.
77. The so-called "flight to quality" may result in a situation in which investors deal
only with the most well established firms. See SEC COMMENTS REQUFST, supra note 2, at
15,907.
78. Any antitrust implications raised by this bifurcated system are beyond the scope of
this comment.
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They maintain that the government securities market is the last truly
free securities market and should remain that way. 79
1. The Government Securities Act of 1986
In the wake of the ESM and BBS failures, legislators were
quick to propose new regulatory legislation. Several pieces of federal
legislation were introduced in 1985 and 1986. After much debate
and the addition of several amendments, a compromise piece of legis-
lation was finally signed into law in October 1986. The Government
Securities Act of 1986 ("the Act") 0 defines government securities
brokers and dealers in detail" and for the first time provides for
regulation of these dealers. However, despite the detailed descrip-
tions of who the dealers are, the Act contains some very large
loopholes. First, the Act provides a general exception for "any per-
son insofar as he buys or sells such securities for his own account." ' 2
In addition, futures traders who deal in government securities are
exempted from the Act if the SEC determines that such activities are
"incidental" to the traders' business."' It will be at the SEC's discre-
tion to decide what will constitute incidental business.
The Act provides that the Secretary of the Treasury shall pro-
pose final rules within 270 days of the signing of this bill into law.84
The rules which the Secretary adopts will be enforced by numerous
government agencies. The Act requires that if a dealer is not already
registered with the SEC or is not a "financial institution"8" then that
dealer must register with the SEC." Dealers already registered with
the SEC and financial institutions must file a written notice 7 with
the appropriate regulatory agency:88 a national bank must file with
the Comptroller of the Currency; 9 a state-chartered bank must file
with the FRB;90 a state-chartered bank which is not a member of the
79. Peters, Regulators Would Do Well to Use the Powers They Already Have, L.A.
Daily J., Apr. 16, 1985, at 4, col. 3.
80. The Government Securities Act of 1986, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78c (West 1981 & Supp.
1987) (1986)) [hereinafter Sec. Act].
81. Id. at §§ 78c(a)(43)-(44).
82. Id. at § 78c(a)(44)(A).
83. Id. at § 78c(a)(44)(D).
84. Id. at § 78c (effective date 270 days after Oct. 28, 1986).
85. Id. at § 78c(a)(46).
86. Id. at § 78o-5.
87. Id. at § 78o-5(a)(l)(B)(i).
88. Id. at § 78(a)(34)(G) (defines "appropriate regulatory agency").
89. Id. at § 78(a)(34)(G)(i).
90. Id. at § 78.
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Federal Reserve System must file with the Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Corporation;91 and a federally-chartered S & L must file with
the Federal Home Loan Bank Board. 2 These various agencies will
also be responsible for both examining the books of the regulated
dealers and enforcing the rules which are adopted by the' Treasury
Department."
III. ANALYSIS
A. The Act Presents an Old Solution to a New Problem
The need for some constraints on the government securities
market seems obvious. However, the Act addresses the government
securities market's problems in the same manner which other securi-
ties markets' problems have been addressed in the past, by
attempting to place a government regulator in the middle of the mar-
ket. This atavistic solution, which was so useful in the 1930's, is not
the best course of action today or for the future. The Securities Act
of 1933," the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, and their
progeny"5 were aimed at protecting the financially unsophisticated
investor." The emphasis of this line of legislation was to prevent
fraud and manipulation of securities created by the dissemination of
inaccurate information to investors. However, these unsophisticated
investors are not present in the government securities market.
1. 1930's Legislation Distinguished
The type of fraud the 1930's legislation protected against is not
the same as that which the government securities market is currently
experiencing. The participants in the government securities market
are not small or unsophisticated investors but rather are institutions
run by professional money managers. Sophisticated financial mana-
gers are much better suited to assess the financial viability of the
institutions with whom they are dealing than are small investors
buying a few shares of "XYZ Corporation." In essence, the partici-
91. Id. at § 78(a)(34)(G)(iii).,
92. Id. at § 78(a)(34)(G)(iv).
93. Id. at § 78o-5(d) (authority to examine records of brokers or dealers); id. at § 78o-
5(c)(2).
94. The Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77(a)-77(aa) (1982).
95. See, e.g., The Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. §§ 79-79z
(1982); The Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-1 (1982); The Securities Inves-
tor Protection Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa-78111 (1982).
96. T.L. HAZEN, supra note 40, at 7.
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pants in today's government securities market are the most sophisti-
cated of investors, and consequently, their need for governmental
protection is minimal.
The government securities market becomes treacherous only
when the participants in the repo market fail to collateralize their
transactions.9" Otherwise, these contracts involve less risk than
corporate securities, since it is unlikely that the United States gov-
ernment will default on its obligations. 8 The only other risks pre-
sent in the government securities market are those of legitimate mar-
ket fluctuations which are, of course, not a regulatory concern. Many
of the problems which this market has experienced could be solved if
the participants would simply take possession of their collateral.
Hence, any attempt to solve the market's problems should begin by
making collateral easier to obtain.
2. The Need for an Efficient Market
The United States government finances its debt by selling
Treasury securities on the government securities market.99 If the
equilibrium existing in the market were to be upset by the added
costs of regulation, 00 the Treasury Department would face a crisis
in selling the nation's bonds. Home loans, student loans, and farm
financing, for example, would be much more difficult to obtain.
Moreover, if the United States were unable to sell its securities, it
would, in effect, be bankrupt.
Thus, regulatory interference will likely reduce the market's
efficiency. 01 Its present degree of efficiency is very desirable and
stems partly from the highly liquid nature of government securities.
There is around-the-clock trading activity in government securities
which makes it possible for investors to buy and sell whenever neces-
sary. This efficiency is one of the market's strongest features and,
therefore, must be protected if the government securities market is to
survive.
97. See supra notes 59-65 and accompanying text.
98. M. Sl;uM, supra note 1, at 430.
99. See F. FABOZZI, supra note 10.
100. Interest rates on government securities would rise to compensate investors
for holding less liquid securities or to enable dealers to recapture their costs. An
increase of just one-tenth of a percentage point in the interest rates on govern-
ment securities would cost taxpayers $1 billion a year. That's far greater than
the sums lost by customers of ESM and BBS.
Worthy, supra note 23, at 81.
101. The government securities market is currently one of the most efficient markets in
the world. See SEC COMMENTS REQuEST, supra note 2, at 15,905.
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In conjunction with the need for liquidity, the importance of
foreign investment should be considered. Foreigners invest billions of
dollars a day in the United States through the government securities
market.1"2 Since government securities are very safe, extremely
liquid, and yield a high return, the government securities market is a
favorite of foreign investors. However, if the features which foreign
investors currently find so attractive are disturbed, the investment
alternatives available in Western Europe and Japan will appear
more lucrative. A loss of foreign capital of this magnitude"0 3 would
greatly exacerbate the United States balance of trade problems.
IV. PROPOSAL
A. Changes Without Overregulating
Overregulating the government securities market may cause a
ripple effect which could create problems worse than those which the
regulation is intended to correct. The most feared of these effects -
increased costs and a loss of investors - could destroy the viability of
this delicate market. Thus, the primary source of government debt
financing and the most efficient tool for exercising monetary policy
would be lost.
Regulation per se is not undesirable; however, overregulation
will not solve the market's current problems. Therefore, in adopting
rules to regulate the government securities market, the Treasury
Department should consider the following suggestions to enable the
market to perform at its current level of efficiency and also prevent
fraud.
1. Reduce the Cost of Collateralization
Reduction of collateralization costs is necessary. The primary
reason that unscrupulous dealers have been able to use the same
securities as collateral in more than one transaction is that the insti-
tutions with whom they are dealing do not secure proper
collateralization. These institutions do not secure collateral because
they are reluctant to incur any additional transaction costs.'0 4
Some observers argue that if a supposedly sophisticated finan-
cial institution was so imprudent as to fail to demand collateral, then
102. TREASURY BULLETIN, supra note 6, at Dec. 1985, Table 3.10 at A-53.
103. Id.
104. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
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it would deserve the resulting losses."" However, it would be possi-
ble to eliminate the prospect of this type of fraud by simply making
it easier and less expensive to secure collateral. This could be accom-
plished by any combination of actions ranging from federal or state
subsidies to a licensing fee for the dealers.
Certainly the federal government has an interest in stabilizing
this system. Federal subsidization would not only enable the federal
government to keep this market, upon which it depends for its debt
financing and monetary policy, functioning in an honest and efficient
manner, but subsidization would probably be less expensive than
creating and maintaining a new regulatory apparatus.
The states' interest in such a plan is also significant. When a
government securities dealer goes bankrupt, a state may face serious
problems, such as those experienced in Ohio.10 6 Another reason that
states should be interested in helping finance the cost of securing
collateral is that municipalities, school boards, and other local enti-
ties are some of the most active participants in the market. If the
market is to remain a viable source of income for these institutions,
some protections must be created.1"7
The government securities dealers can also contribute to the
financing of wire costs through licensing fees and other revenue
raising taxes. Not only would these fees and taxes raise the needed
monies but they would also provide a way to identify the secondary
dealers. Moreover, the dealers have an interest in helping finance
wire costs: to prevent more radical regulation which would reduce
their autonomy, or even destroy the market upon which their liveli-
hood depends.
2. Insure Qualified Dealers
Another possible change which the Treasury Department
should consider and which would place a relatively small burden on
the dealers is to require proof of dealer qualification. Dealers should
have to demonstrate that they possess the basic knowledge needed to
105. See Bleiberg, Scandals in Governments: Federal Regulation Will Do More Harm
Than Good, BARRON'S, Apr. 15, 1985, at 84.
106. See supra notes 66-71 and accompanying text.
107. See generally NEW YORK WAYS AND MEANS REPORT, supra note 7. See also
Statement of Assemblyman A. Kremer: "How many times do local governments have to be
burned before they realize they just can't handle complicated investment situations."
Scherschel, Do Government Securities Need Tighter Controls?, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD RE-
PORT, Apr. 8, 1985, at 84.
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trade government securities.' Requirements for dealer qualification
were not included in the Act but could easily be facilitated through
the administration of a written examination, similar to those exami-
nations now given to participants in other securities markets. °9
These examinations would not necessarily prevent fraud but they
would ensure that those who hold themselves out as government
securities dealers have at least a rudimentary knowledge of the sub-
ject with which they are dealing.
3. A Regulatory Body
Implementation of the above suggestions will, of course, require
a regulatory body. Under the Act, the Treasury Department is
responsible for enacting the rules and various government agencies
are responsible for executing the regulatory duties. However, be-
cause each agency will be in charge of regulating a specific group of
market participants, the potential for different interpretations and
applications of the Treasury Rules is very likely.
A better approach would be for the Treasury Department to
create a governing board consisting of representatives of the various
regulatory agencies and the industry, and confer in this board arbi-
tration and interpretive powers. In this way, the rules would be
more consistent and less subject to the vagaries of individual
interpretation.
B. Proposed Changes Retain Market's Efficiency While Address-
ing Its Current Problems
The changes which this comment proposes would allow the
government securities market to maintain its viability without impos-
ing overly cumbersome requirements. This market can thus continue
to function with the efficiency it has demonstrated in the past. If the
changes suggested in this comment were adopted, failures such as
ESM and BBS would not likely be repeated because the transactions
would be collateralized. There would be no disincentive to demand
108. One observer estimates that there are only about 300 people trained to trade gov-
ernment securities. M. STIGUM, supra note 1, at 462.
109. For example, stockbrokers must pass either the "Series 7" General Securities Rep-
resentative Examination to conduct a general securities business, or a more specialized
examination or examinations to qualify to conduct specific limited types of business. Similarly,
supervisory personnel must pass the relevant principal examinations. These examinations gen-
erally parallel the categories of examinations applicable to stockbrokers, with additional exam-
ination, such as one for financial and operational principals. See, e.g., NASD By-Laws, Article
I, §§ 1-2.
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collateral, as there currently is due to the wire charges. In addition,
the governing board would be aware of the participants' activities
because they would be tested and licensed. Thus, the anonymity
which the unscrupulous dealers have found so convenient, would no
longer exist.
V. CONCLUSION
In the last few years, the government securities market has
become one of the most important parts of the American economy,
while remaining essentially unregulated. However, in the early
19 80's several bankruptcies of unregulated dealers, culminating in
the near collapse of the Ohio savings and loan industry, prompted
legislators to scrutinize the market more closely. The resulting regu-
latory legislation is essentially the same type of regulation that was
so effective during the Great Depression. However, the government
securities market differs greatly from the markets that existed in the
1930's. The speed, size, and efficiency of government securities
transactions would baffle a 1930's stock trader. The efficiency of this
market is possible only because it has not had regulatory constraints
imposed upon it. Rather than looking to the past to solve the mar-
ket's problems, a new approach is needed. Correction of a few faulty
links, such as uncollateralized transactions and unqualified dealers,
is necessary, instead of an entire overhaul of the market.
Terry F. Rogers
1987]

